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Abstract
There are two main approaches for defining social welfare relations for
an economy with infinite horizon. The first one is to consider the set
of intertemporal utility streams generated by a general set of bounded
consumptions, and define a preference relation between them. This re-
lation is ideally required to satisfy two main axioms, the Pareto axiom,
which guarantees efficiency, and the Anonymity axiom, which guarantees
equity. Basu and Mitra [2003] show that it is impossible to represent by
a function a preference relation embodying both the efficiency and equity
requirements and Basu and Mitra [2007] propose and characterize a new
welfare criterion called utilitarian social welfare relation.
In the same framework, Chichilnisky [1996] proposes two axioms that
capture the idea of sustainable growth: non-dictatorship of the present and
non-dictatorship of the future, and exhibits a mixed criterion, adding a dis-
counted utilitarian part (with possibly non constant discount rates), which
gives a dictatorial role to the present, and a long term part, which gives
a dictatorial role to the future. The drawback of Chichilnisky’s approach
is that it often does not allow to explicitly characterize optimal growth
∗The authors thank Bertrand Wigniolle for helpful comments and suggestions.
†Corresponding author. Address: Universite´ de Lille I, Faculte´ de sciences e´conomiques et
sociales, 59655 Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France.
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paths with optimal control techniques. Moreover, we observe that the op-
timal solution obtained with Chichilnisky’s criterion, cannot in general be
approximated by a sequence of optimal solutions with finite horizon.
Our aim is less general than Chichilnisky’s, and Basu and Mitra’s:
we want to have a non-dictatorial criterion for optimal growth models.
Instead of l∞+ as set of utilities, we just consider the set of utilities of
consumptions which are generated by a specific technology. We show that
the undiscounted utilitarian criterion pioneered by Ramsey [1928] is not
only convenient if one wants to solve an optimal growth problem but also
sustainable, efficient and equitable.
JEL classification codes: D60, D70, D90, Q0
Keywords: Anonimity, intergenerational equity, natural resources, non-dictatorship
of the future, non-dictatorship of the present, optimal growth models, Pareto,
social welfare function, social welfare relation, sustainability, utilitarian undis-
counted criterion.
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1 Introduction
Optimal growth theory is largely built around the discounted utilitarian ap-
proach, but the debate between authors subscribing to discounted utilitarian-
ism and authors rejecting it has always been vivid. Ramsey [1928] himself, in a
much-cited statement, held that “discount later enjoyments in comparison with
earlier ones [is] a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from
the weakness of imagination”. This debate is particularly passionate when the
sustainability of growth is concerned, because the process of discounting forces
a fundamental asymmetry between present and future generations, particularly
those in the distant future, and so appears to be in contradiction with the
intergenerational equity concern underlying the search for sustainability.
There are two main approaches for defining social welfare relations for an
economy with infinite horizon. The first one is to consider the set of intertem-
poral utility streams generated by a general set of bounded consumptions, and
define a preference relation between them. This relation is ideally required to
satisfy two main axioms, the Pareto axiom and the Anonymity axiom. Pareto
guarantees efficiency. Broadly speaking, it demands that the preference rela-
tion is sensitive to the well-being of each generation. Anonymity guarantees
equity, that is an equal treatment of all generations. Besides, preferences are
often required to be independent and to satisfy some continuity, transitivity
and completeness properties. Unfortunately, in this framework, Basu and Mi-
tra [2003] show that no social welfare function can satisfy simultaneously the
Pareto and Anonymity axioms: it is impossible to represent by a function a
preference relation embodying both the efficiency and equity requirements.
The second approach abandons the axiomatic foundations and proposes
social welfare functions in the framework of optimal growth models. In this
setting, we consider the consumption streams generated by a specific technology.
Several welfare functions have been proposed in the literature for computing
optimal sustainable growth paths1. The Rawlsian or maximin criterion (Rawls
[1971], Solow [1974]) maximizes the utility of the least well off generation. The
undiscounted utilitarian criterion (Ramsey [1928], Koopmans [1965]) minimizes
the infinite sum of the differences between actual utilities and their upper bound
(the bliss), with a zero utility discount rate. The overtaking criterion (von
Weizacker [1965], Gale [1967]) replaces an infinite sum of utilities by a finite
one, and says that one utility stream is better than another one if from some date
on the first one is greater than the second one. Whereas the usual discounted
utilitarian criterion assumes a constant discount rate, criteria with non constant
and declining discount rates, hyperbolic for instance, have also been used (see
1For a complete survey on these criteria and their abilty to cope with the sustainability
issue, see Heal [1998].
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e.g. Heal [1998]).
Basu and Mitra [2007] propose and characterize a new welfare criterion
called the utilitarian social welfare relation. They apply this criterion to a one-
dimension neoclassical Ramsey model. In fact, they implicitely use a utilitarian
undiscounted social welfare function, as in Gale [1967], Brock [1970a], Dana and
Le Van [1990] and Dana and Le Van [1993].
Chichilnisky [1996] proposes two axioms that capture the idea of sustain-
able growth: no dictatorship of the present and no dictatorship of the future.
A social welfare function is said to give a dictatorial role to the present if it dis-
regards the utilities of all generations from some generation on. Conversely, a
social welfare function gives a dictatorial role to the future if it is only sensitive
to the utilities of the generations coming after some generation. She exhibits,
for the set of uniformly bounded consumptions, a social welfare criterion satis-
fying, besides the Pareto and independence requirements, these two axioms for
sustainability, under a fairly general set of assumptions. She also claims that
this criterion is the only one to do so. Chichilnisky’s criterion is a mixed crite-
rion, adding a discounted utilitarian part (with possibly non constant discount
rates), which gives a dictatorial role to the present, and a long term part, which
gives a dictatorial role to the future.
Chichilnisky [1996] examines the ability of some of the other criteria to
define sustainable preferences, in the sense that they satisfy the two axioms
for sustainability in her general framework. She shows for example that the
Ramsey’s criterion fails because it is not a well defined real valued function on
all l∞2, and cannot therefore define a complete order on l∞. The overtaking
criterion also fails because it is not a well defined function of l∞, since it cannot
rank a pair of utility streams of l∞ for which neither the first overtakes the
second, nor the second overtakes the first. The maximin criterion fails because
it does not satisfy the independence property.
The drawback of Chichilnisky’s criterion is that it often does not allow to ob-
tain explicit optimal growth paths with optimal control techniques. Chichilnisky
[1996] does not apply her criterion to growth models but confines herself the
axiomatic approach. Applications are presented in Chichilnisky [1997] and Heal
[1998], in the framework of canonical optimal growth models with exhaustible
or renewable resources. Using non-standard techniques, they obtain a solution
in the case of exhaustible resources, but they show that no solution exists in
the model with renewable resources. Figuie`res and Tidball [2006] focus on this
inexistence result, and show that they can find in the model with renewable
resources “near optimal” growth paths. Moreover, we observe that the optimal
solution obtained with Chichilnisky’s criterion, cannot in general be approxi-
2l∞ =
˘
(yg)g=1,...∞ : yg ∈ R, supg |yg| <∞
¯
.
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mated by a sequence of optimal solutions with finite horizon.
Observe that the criterion proposed by Chichilnisky does not satisfy Anonymity,
and Basu and Mitra [2007] do not prove that their criterion satisfies non-
dictatorship requirements.
Our aim is less general than Chichilnisky’s, and also less than Basu and
Mitra: we want to have a non-dictatorial, anonymous and paretian criterion for
optimal growth models. Instead of l∞+ as set of utilities, we just consider the
set of utilities of consumptions which are generated by a specific technology.
We define an independent sustainable welfare criterion for an economy defined
by a technology with decreasing returns for high levels of capital. That means
our criterion is specific for this economy. Our results are therefore less general,
but we can characterize optimal growth paths3.
Our main result is to show that the undiscounted utilitarian criterion pi-
oneered by Ramsey [1928] is an independent non-dictatorial welfare criterion
for an economy which satisfies the assumptions listed in Section 2. Besides,
Gale [1967], Dana and Le Van [1990] and Dana and Le Van [1993] require that
the technology must be of decreasing returns. Here, we drop this assumption.
We show that the turnpike result in Gale [1967] also holds with non-convex
technologies. Another advantage of the use of this criterion is that any good
programme, i.e. any programme for which the intertemporal utility is well de-
fined, converges to a steady state corresponding to the Golden Rule. But our
undiscounted social welfare function satisfies also the Anonymity and Pareto
axioms. We then show that in a muti-dimension optimal growth model, the
capital stocks which are optimal by using the undiscounted utilitarian criterion
are maximal for the Basu-Mitra criterion. We extend their result obtained for
the one-dimension case. To sum up, if we just consider the good programmes
(as defined by Gale [1967]), we obtain a social welfare function which is not only
convenient if one wants to solve an optimal growth problem but also sustainable,
efficient and equitable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set the model, Section
3 introduces the good programmes and proves their turnpike property. Section
4 recalls the concept of non-dictatorship for the welfare criteria. Section 5 de-
fines the independent and non-dictatorial criterion for our model. Applications
are set in Section 6. In particular, we present an economy with a convex-
concave production function (see Dechert and Nishimura [1983]). In Dechert
and Nishimura [1983], the proof of existence of a poverty trap is given, but
its precise value is not easy to compute. As a by product, we obtain here the
explicit value of this poverty trap. We also present two growth models respec-
3Note however that Chichilnisky [1996], Basu and Mitra [2007] impose that utilities are in
[0, 1]N. By doing so, they implicitely assume a bounded technology.
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tively with exhaustible and renewable resources. Section 7 is devoted to some
comments. In particular, we show there that we obtain a social welfare function
on the set of good programmes and the optimal path is a maximal element for
the Basu-Mitra criterion.
2 The set-up
We consider an intertemporal economy where the instantaneous utility of the
representative consumer depends on xt, the capital stock on hand at date t,
and on xt+1, the capital stock for date t+1. Given xt, the set of feasible capital
stocks for the next period t + 1 is Γ(xt). We assume that at any period t the
feasible capital stock on hand belongs to X, a subset of Rn+. More explicitly,
we make the following assumptions4.
Assumptions
H1: X = ∪+∞i=1Kj , where {Kj} is a sequence of increasing (i.e. Kj ⊆ Kj+1, ∀j)
compact, convex sets of Rn+ with non-empty interior, and X contains 0.
H2: Γ is a continuous correspondence with non-empty images. It satisfies
∀j,Γ(Kj) ⊆ Kj , ∀j. Its graph is the set graphΓ = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X : y ∈ Γ(x)} .
H3: intgraphΓ, the interior of the graph of Γ, is non-empty.
H4: For any x ∈ X, 0 ∈ Γ(x).
We will denote by cographΓ the convex hull of graphΓ.
H5: The instantaneous utility function u : cographΓ → R is strictly concave
and continuous. It is increasing with respect to the first variable and decreasing
with respect to the second variable.
For the simplicity of our presentation we also assume the following.
H6: The function u is differentiable in intcographΓ.
H7: The set I(X) = {x ∈ X : (x, x) ∈ graphΓ} is compact.
Remark 1 1. Dana and Le Van [1990] show that the following assumptions
imply intgraphΓ 6= ∅ (H3):.
- Free disposal assumption: If y ∈ Γ(x), x′ ≥ x, y′ ≤ y, x′ ∈ X, y′ ∈ X, then
y′ ∈ Γ(x′).
- Existence of expansible capital stocks: There exists (x, y) ∈ graphΓ, with
y >> x, i.e. yi > xi, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
2. Moreover, the Free disposal assumption implies 0 ∈ Γ(x) for any x ∈ X
(H4).
4This set-up is borrowed from Dana and Le Van [1990], but we do not assume neither that
graphΓ is convex, i.e. we do not impose a technology with decreasing returns to scale, nor
that X is compact.
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3. If Γ is continuous and satisfies the condition:
There exists a number a such that {‖x‖ ≥ a, y ∈ Γ(x)} ⇒ ‖y‖ < ‖x‖,
then I(X) is compact.
4. An example where H1–H2 and H7 are satisfied. Let X = R+ and K0 =
[0, 1], ..,Kn = [0, n + 1], .... Let Γ(x) = {y ∈ R+ : y ∈ [0, f(x)]}, where f is
a continuous increasing function which satisfies f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, f(x) <
x, ∀x > 1.
Obviously, when X is compact then H1–H2 and H7 are satisfied.
A sequence x is feasible from x0 ∈ X if, ∀t ≥ 0, xt+1 ∈ Γ(xt).We denote by
Π(x0) the set of feasible sequences from x0. Following Gale [1967], a programme
from x0 is a feasible sequence from x0. The set of programmes is denoted by Π,
i.e. Π = ∪x∈XΠ(x).
Lemma 1 Assume H1–H2. Then Π(x0) is compact for the product topology.
Proof : See e.g. Le Van and Dana [2003], chapter 4.
3 Good Programmes
Definition 1 A stationary point (x, x) satisfies
u = u(x, x) = max {u(x, x) : (x, x) ∈ graphΓ} .
Proposition 1 There exists a stationary point (x, x) which satisfies
(i) u = u(x, x) = max {u(x, x) : (x, x) ∈ graphΓ} ;
(ii) if (x, x) ∈ intgraphΓ, then
u(x, y) + u1(x, x)y − u1(x, x)x ≤ u(x, x), ∀(x, y) ∈ graphΓ.
Proof : (i) Since I(X) is compact, the proof of the existence of (x, x) is obviu-
ous.
(ii) If (x, x) is interior then u1(x, x) + u2(x, x) = 0. Since u is concave, for any
(x, y) ∈ graphΓ, we have
u(x, x)− u(x, y) ≥ u1(x, x)(x− x) + u2(x, x)(x− y) = u1(x, x)y − u1(x, x)x
We now add another assumption.
H8: (x, x) ∈ intgraphΓ.
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Assumption H8 is not very restrictive, since in the one dimension Ramsey
model it implies that consumption is strictly positive at the Golden Rule. In-
deed, if Γ(x) = {y : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(x)} where f is the production function, then x
satisfies u = maxx u(f(x)− x).
Let p¯ = u1(x, x).
Proposition 2 Under H1-H8, (x, x) is the unique solution to problem
max {u(x, y) + p¯y − p¯x : (x, y) ∈ graphΓ} .
Proof : Let (xˆ, yˆ) be another solution. Then
u(xˆ, yˆ) + p¯yˆ − p¯xˆ = u(x¯, x¯). (1)
Since (x, x) ∈ intgraphΓ, for λ ∈ (0, 1), close enough to 1, we have
(λx+ (1− λ)xˆ, λx+ (1− λ)yˆ) ∈ graphΓ.
Denote xλ = λx+ (1− λ)xˆ, yλ = λx+ (1− λ)yˆ. Then
λu(x, x) + (1− λ)u(xˆ, yˆ) + p¯yλ − p¯xλ < u(xλ, yλ) + p¯yλ − p¯xλ ≤ u(x, x),
and then
λu(x, x) + (1− λ) [u(xˆ, yˆ) + p¯yˆ − p¯xˆ] < u(x, x)
or equivalently
u(xˆ, yˆ) + p¯yˆ − p¯xˆ < u(x, x)
in contradiction with (1).
Theorem 1 Assume H1-H8. For any programme x, either
(i) limT→+∞
∑T
t=0 [u(xt, xt+1)− u¯] exists in R and xt → x,
or (ii) limT→+∞
∑T
t=0 [u(xt, xt+1)− u¯] = −∞.
Proof : Theorem 1 is identical to Proposition 1.3.1 and Corollary 1.3.2. in Le
Van and Dana [2003]. But we have to modify the proof since graphΓ is not
assumed to be convex. Consider limT→+T
∑T
t=0 [u(xt, xt+1) + p¯xt+1 − p¯xt − u¯]
which exists in R−∪{−∞} since ∀t, u(xt, xt+1)+ p¯xt+1− p¯xt− u¯ ≤ 0. We have
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1) + p¯xt+1 − p¯xt − u¯] =
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u¯]− p¯(x0 − xT+1) (2)
If limT→+∞
∑T
t=0 [u(xt, xt+1) + p¯xt+1 − p¯xt − u¯] ∈ R− then u(xt, xt+1)+p¯xt+1−
p¯xt → u¯. There exists j such that x0 ∈ Kj . That implies xt ∈ Kj , ∀t. Let (xˆ, yˆ)
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be a cluster point of {(xt, xt+1)}. Then u(xˆ, yˆ) + p¯yˆ − p¯xˆ = u¯. From Proposi-
tion 2, (xˆ, yˆ) = (x, x). Therefore the sequence (xt) converges to x. From (2),∑∞
t=0 [u(xt, xt+1)− u¯] ∈ R.
Relation (2) implies
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u¯] ≤
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1) + p¯xt+1 − p¯xt − u¯] + |p¯.x0|+ |p¯.xT+1|.
Hence, if
lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1) + p¯xt+1 − p¯xt − u¯] = −∞,
then limT→+∞
∑∞
t=0 [u(xt, xt+1)− u¯] = −∞, since the sequence (xT+1) is bounded.
Definition 2 A programme x ∈ Π(x0) is good if limT→∞
∑T
t=0 [u(xt, xt+1)− u(x, x)]
exists in R.
Definition 3 The set of the good programmes x ∈ Π(x0) is denoted G(x0).
From Theorem 1 one gets:
Corollary 1 Assume H1-H8. If x ∈ G(x0), then xt → x.
The following lemma, which seems to be just technical, is actually crucial
to prove that the criterion we propose is non-dictatorial.
Lemma 2 For any x0 ∈ X, the set of good programmes from x0 is open (for
the product topology) in Π(x0).
Proof : If G(x0) is empty, the proof is over. So, assume G(x0) 6= ∅. Let x
∈ G(x0). We first claim that there exists T such that (xT , xT+1) ∈ intgraphΓ,
and (xT+1, xT+2) ∈ intgraphΓ.
Indeed, there exists T1 such that (xT1 , xT1+1) ∈ intgraphΓ. If not, ∀t, (xt, xt+1) ∈
∂graphΓ and, by taking the limit, (x, x) ∈ ∂graphΓ since ∂graphΓ is closed:
contradiction with assumption H8.
Since the sequence (xt)t≥T1+1 belongs to G(xT1), there exists an infinite se-
quence {(xTn , xTn+1)} ⊂ int graphΓ. Consider the sequence {(xTn+1, xTn+2)} .
If for any n, (xTn+1, xTn+2) ∈ ∂graphΓ we obtain again a contradiction (x, x) ∈
∂graphΓ. Hence there exists n such that (xTn+1, xTn+2) ∈ int graphΓ. The
claim is proved.
Let T satisfy (xT , xT+1) ∈ int graphΓ, (xT+1, xT+2) ∈ int graphΓ. There exists
an open ball B(xT+1, ε) such that for any y ∈ B(xT+1, ε) we have (xT , y) ∈ int
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graphΓ, (y, xT+1) ∈ int graphΓ. The sequence obtained from (xt) by replacing
xT+1 by y is in G(x0). That proves the openness of G(x0) for the product
topology.
4 Non-Dictatorial Criteria
We now define, following Chichilnisky [1996], the concepts of non-dictatorship
of the present and non-dictatorship of the future.
Let l∞+ = {(at)t=0,...,+∞ : at ≥ 0, ∀t, supt at < +∞} . A criterion W is an
increasing function from l∞+ into R.
A criterion W exhibits No Dictatorship of the Present if for any a ∈
l∞+ , b ∈ l∞+ which satisfy W (a) > W (b), then, for any N , there exist k ≥ N ,
(ct)t≥k+1, (dt)t≥k+1 such that
W (a0, ..., ak, ck+1, ..., ck+t, ...) ≤W (b0, ..., bk, dk+1, ..., dk+t, ...).
A criterion W exhibits No Dictatorship of the Future if for any a ∈
l∞+ , b ∈ l∞+ which satisfy W (a) > W (b), then, for any N , there exist k ≥ N ,
(ct)t=0,...,k, (dt)t=0,..,k such that
W (c0, ..., ck, ak+1, ..., ak+t, ...) ≤W (d0, ..., dk, bk+1, ..., bk+t, ...).
5 A non-dictatorial criterion for optimal growth mod-
els
We consider the economy set in Section 2. Let us consider the problem
max lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u(x, x)]
under the constraints
∀t, xt+1 ∈ Γ(xt), x0 is given.
Consider x ∈ Π(x0) and the function W : Π→ ]−∞,+∞[ defined by
W (x) = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u(x, x)] .
Proposition 3 Assume H1–H8. Then W is upper semi-continuous for the
product topology.
Proof : See Dana and Le Van [1990].
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Definition 4 No dictatorship of the present
Assume that x and x′ are two good programmes which satisfy W (x) >
W (x′). Then ∀N, ∃k ≥ N, ∃z ∈ G(xk+1), ∃z′ ∈ G(x′k+1), satisfying
k∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u] + [u(xk+1, zk+2)− u] +
∞∑
t=k+2
[u(zt, zt+1)− u]
≤
k∑
t=0
[
u(x′t, x
′
t+1)− u
]
+
[
u(x′k+1, z
′
k+2)− u
]
+
∞∑
t=k+2
[
u(z′t, z
′
t+1)− u
]
.
Theorem 2 Assume H1–H8. W exhibits no dictatorship of the present.
Proof : Assume W (x) > W (x′) > −∞ with x ∈ G(x0), x′ ∈ G(x′0). Let N
be given. Then the sequence (xt)t≥N+2 ∈ G(xN+1). Observe that the set of
bad programmes is not empty, since for any x0, the programme (x0, 0, ..., 0, ...)
is bad. That means G(x0) differs from Π(x0). In this case, let (zt)t≥N+2 ∈
∂G(xN+1). From Lemma 1, it is not a good programme. There exists an infinite
sequence ((znt )t≥N+2)n of programmes in G(xN+1) which converges to (zt)t≥N+2
for the product topology. Since W is upper semi-continuous, we have
lim
[
N∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u] +
[
u(xN+1, znN+2)− u
]
+
∞∑
t=N+2
[
u(znt , z
n
t+1)− u
]]
≤
[
N∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u] + [u(xN+1, zN+2)− u] +
∞∑
t=N+2
[u(zt, zt+1)− u]
]
= −∞.
Hence, for N large enough,[
N∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u] +
[
u(xN+1, znN+2)− u
]
+
∞∑
t=N+2
[
u(znt , z
n
t+1)− u
]]
≤
∞∑
t=0
[
u(x′t, x
′
t+1)− u
]
.
Definition 5 No dictatorship of the future
LetW (x) > W (x′) > −∞. Then ∀N, ∃k ≥ N, ∃(z0, ..., zk+1), ∃(z′0, ..., z′k+1),
satisfying
k∑
t=0
[u(zt, zt+1)− u] + [u(zk+1, xk+2)− u] +
∞∑
t=k+2
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
≤
k∑
t=0
[
u(z′t, z
′
t+1)− u
]
+
[
u(z′k+1, x
′
k+2)− u
]
+
∞∑
t=k+2
[
u(x′t, x
′
t+1)− u
]
.
11
Theorem 3 Assume H1–H8. W exhibits no dictatorship of the future.
Proof : Assume W (x) > W (x′) with x ∈ G(x0), x′ ∈ G(x′0). Let N be given.
Since (x, x) ∈ int graphΓ, there exists an open ball B((x, x), ρ) ∈ int graphΓ.
Take (x′, x′) ∈ B((x, x), ρ2), with (x′, x′) 6= (x, x). Since (xt) → x, ∃k ≥ N
such that ∀t ≥ k, (xt, xt+1) ∈ B((x, x), ρ2) and (x′, xt) ∈ int graphΓ. Let
ε > 0. Then for any k large enough
∣∣∑∞
t=k+1 [u(xt, xt+1)− u]
∣∣ ≤ ε. Observe
that u(x′, x′) − u < 0 by assumption H7 and if ξt = x′ ∀t = 0, ...,∞, then∑∞
t=0
[
u(ξt, ξt+1)− u
]
= −∞. Let zt = x′ ∀t = 0, ..., k. Then
k−1∑
t=0
[u(zt, zt+1)− u] + [u(zk, xt+1)− u] +
∞∑
t=k+1
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
≤
k−1∑
t=0
[u(zt, zt+1)− u] + max
(x,y)∈ graphΓ
[u(x, y)− u] + ε,
and
lim
k→∞
[
k−1∑
t=0
[u(zt, zt+1)− u] + [u(zk, xt+1)− u] +
∞∑
t=k+1
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
]
= −∞.
Therefore, for k large enough,
k−1∑
t=0
[u(zt, zt+1)− u] + [u(zk, xt+1)− u] +
∞∑
t=k+1
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
≤
∞∑
t=0
[
u(x′t, x
′
t+1)− u
]
.
Theorem 4 Assume H1–H8. If G(x0 6= ∅, then there exists an optimal path.
It is unique if graphΓ is convex.
Proof : From proposition 3 and lemma 1, for the product topology, W is usc
and Π(x0) is compact. Therefore, an optimal path exists, since the problem is
to maximize W (x) with x ∈ Π(x0). This optimal path is unique when graphΓ
is convex since u is assumed strictly concave.
6 Applications
6.1 Convex technology
Assume graphΓ is convex. Now, let X = R+, K0 = [0, 1], Kj = [0, j+1], j ≥
1, Γ(x) = [0, f(x)] where f is strictly concave, increasing, differentiable with
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f ′(0) > 1, f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, and u(x, y) = v(f(x)−y), where v is real-valued,
defined on R+, increasing, strictly concave, differentiable. It is easy to check
H1-H7. Observe that the stationary point x is defined by f ′(x) = 1. It is
therefore unique. Obviously, 0 < x < f(x) < 1. In other words, H8 is satisfied.
We claim that G(x0) 6= 0, ∀x0 > 0. Indeed, since f t(x0) → 1 when t → +∞,
there exists T such that fT (x0) ≤ f(x) and fT+1(x0) > f(x). The sequence
(x0, f(x0), ..., fT (x0), x, x, ..., x, ...) ∈ G(x0).
6.2 Economy with a convex-concave production function
Let X = R+, K0 = [0, 1], Kj = [0, j + 1], j ≥ 1, Γ(x) = [0, f(x)]. Here we
suppose that f is increasing, continuously differentiable, f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1,
strictly convex between 0 and xI < 1 and strictly concave in [xI , +∞[. The
function u is as before u(x, y) = v(f(x)− y), where v is real-valued, defined on
R+, increasing, strictly concave, differentiable.
Let a = maxx∈X
{
f(x)
x
}
and xa ∈ X satisfy a =
{
f(xa)
xa
}
. Let F be defined
as follows: F (x) = ax, ∀x ≤ xa; F (x) = f(x), x ≥ xa. Then F is concave and
{(x, y) ∈ X ×X : y ≤ F (x)} is cographΓ.
When f ′(0) > 1, there exists a unique x ∈ (xI , 1) such that f ′(x) = 1.
One can check that 0 < x < f(x) < 1, i.e. (x, x) ∈ int graphΓ. Assumptions
H1–H8 are satisfied. Again G(0) = ∅ and G(x0) 6= ∅ if x0 > 0.
Now assume f ′(0) < 1 < f(xa)xa and f
′(xI) > 1 (see figure 1). There are two
points x, x such that f ′(x) = f ′(x) = 1. But f(x)−x < 0, i.e. (x, x) /∈ graphΓ.
We have a unique stationary point x. It satisfies 0 < x < f(x) < 1, i.e. (x, x) ∈
int graphΓ. Again, H1–H8 are satisfied.
Let x˜ satisfy f(x˜) = x˜. then x˜ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, x < x˜ ⇒ f(x) < x and
1 > x > x˜⇒ f(x) > x. That implies
(i) any feasible path from x0 < x˜ will converge to 0. Hence, G(x0) = ∅ for any
x0 ≤ x˜.
(ii) for any x0 > x˜, f t(x0)→ 1. Hence, one can find T such that fT (x0) ≤ x and
fT+1(x0) > f(x). The sequence (x0, f(x0), ..., fT (x0), x, x, ..., x, ...) ∈ G(x0).
Thus, G(x0) 6= ∅ for any x0 > x˜.
One concludes that x˜ is the poverty trap.
6.3 Growth and exhaustible resources
We consider the model in Le Van, Schubert and Nguyen [2007]. The coun-
try possesses a stock of a non-renewable natural resource S0. This resource is
extracted at a rate Rt, and then sold abroad at a price Pt, in terms of the
numeraire, which is the domestic single consumption good. The inverse de-
mand function for the resource is P (Rt). The revenue from the sale of the
natural resource, φ(Rt) = P (Rt)Rt, is used to buy a foreign good, which is
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Figure 1: The convex-concave technology
supposed to be a perfect substitute of the domestic good, used for consump-
tion and capital accumulation. The domestic production function is F (kt),
where kt is physical capital. The depreciation rate is δ. We define the function
f(kt) = F (kt) + (1 − δ)kt, and we name it for simplicity the technology. The
constraints of the economy are:
∀t, ct ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 0,
ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt) + φ(Rt),
+∞∑
t=0
Rt ≤ S0,
S0 > 0, k0 ≥ 0 are given,
where ct is consumption. We assume that f is strictly concave, f(0) = 0, f ′(+∞) <
1, f ′(0) > 1. Let k˜ satisfy k˜ = f(k˜) + φ(S0). Such a k˜ is unique. Take X =
[0, k˜]× [0, S0]. Let x = (k,R). Define Γ(x) = {(y,R) : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k) + φ(R)}.
One can check that Γ is continuous and maps X into X. Observe that any
feasible sequence {Rt} will converge to zero. We also assume φ′(0) < +∞.
The representative consumer has an instaneous utility function u which is in-
creasing, strictly concave, satisfies u(0) = 0. We show that the methodology of
Sections 2–4 may be used for the present model.
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Let k¯ satisfy
u(f(k¯)− k¯) = max {u(f(k)− k) : 0 ≤ k ≤ f(k)}
= max {u(f(k)− k) : 0 ≤ k ≤ f(k) + φ(S0)}
Such a k¯ is unique and satisfies 0 < k¯ < f(k¯) and f ′(k¯) = 1. Let p¯ = u′(f(k¯)−k¯).
We let to the reader to prove the following claim (see the proofs of Propositions
1, 2).
Claim 1
(k¯, k¯, 0) is the unique solution to problem
max
{
u(f(k)− y + φ(R)) + p¯y − p¯k − p¯φ′(0)R : ((k,R), (y,R)) ∈ graphΓ} .
Let u¯ = u(f(k¯)− k¯).
Claim 2 For any program (k,R), either
(i) limT→+∞
∑T
t=0 [u(f(kt)− kt+1 + φ(Rt))− u¯] exists in R and kt → k¯, Rt →
0,
or (ii) limT→+∞
∑T
t=0 [u(f(kt)− kt+1 + φ(Rt))− u¯] = −∞
Proof of Claim 2
(i) and (ii): Observe that
T∑
t=0
[
u(f(kt)− kt+1 + φ(Rt)) + p¯kt+1 − p¯kt − p¯φ′(0)Rt − u¯
]
=
T∑
t=0
[u(f(kt)− kt+1 + φ(Rt))− u¯] + p¯(kT+1 − k0)− p¯φ′(0)
T∑
t=0
Rt.
Since
∑T
t=0Rt converges, use Claim 1 and the proof of Theorem 1 to conclude.
A programme {(k,R)} is good if ∑+∞t=0 [u(f(kt)− kt+1 + φ(Rt))− u¯] ∈ R.
Let
Z(k0, S0) = {(k, y) : ∃R ∈ [0, S0], 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k) + φ(R)} .
Obviously, (k¯, k¯) ∈ intZ(k0, S0). Let
Ψ(k0, S0) = {k : ∃{Rt}, ∀t, Rt ∈ [0, S0], {(k,R)} is a good programme} .
Claim 3 Ψ(k0, S0) is open for the product topology.
Proof of Claim 3
If Ψ(k0, S0) is empty, we are done. So, let k ∈ Ψ(k0, S0). Use the same kind of
proof as in Lemma 2 and the openness of Ψ(k0, S0).
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Now define
W (k,R) = lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=0
[u(f(kt)− kt+1 + φ(Rt))− u¯] .
W is upper semi-continuous and non-dictatorial. The optimal solution (k∗,R∗)
to
max
(k,R)
W (k,R)
under the constraints
∀t, 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt) + φ(Rt), k0 is given
+∞∑
t=0
Rt ≤ S0,
will converges to (k¯, 0).
6.4 Growth and renewable resources
We study the canonical model of growth with a renewable resource5. The
economy possesses a stock of a renewable natural resource S0. This resource
is extracted at a rate Rt. The domestic production function is F (kt, Rt). kt is
the stock of physical capital. The depreciation rate is δ. The natural growth
of the renewable resource is St+1 − St = H(St). The function H is strictly
concave, differentiable, satisfies H(0) = 0, H(Sˆ) = 0, with Sˆ > 0. There is a
representative consumer with a utility function u depending on her consumption
c. The technological constraints for each period t are as follows:
ct + kt+1 ≤ F (kt, Rt) + kt(1− δ)
St+1 ≤ St +H(St)−Rt.
Let ψ(S) = S+H(S). The function ψ is strictly concave, ψ(0) = 0, ψ′(+∞) <
1, since H ′(+∞) < 0. We define the function f(kt, Rt) = F (kt, Rt) + (1− δ)kt,
and we name it for simplicity the technology. We assume that F is strictly
concave, F (0, R) = F (k, 0) = 0, F1(+∞, ψ(Sˆ)) < δ, F1(0, ψ(Sˆ)) > δ.
The constraints become
0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt, Rt)
0 ≤ St+1 ≤ ψ(St)−Rt.
Let kˆ satisfy kˆ = f(kˆ, ψ(Sˆ)). Let X = [0, kˆ] × [0, Sˆ] and for x = (k, S)
define
Γ(x) =
{
x′ = (k′, S′) : 0 ≤ k′ ≤ f(k, ψ(S)− S′), 0 ≤ S′ ≤ ψ(S)}
5See for instance Ayong Le Kama [2001].
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Γ is continuous and maps X into X. Its graph is convex. There exists a unique
x¯ = (k¯, S¯) such that (x¯, x¯) is in the interior of graphΓ and solves
max {u(f(k, ψ(S)− S)− k) : ((k, S), (k, S)) ∈ graphΓ} .
Namely, f1(k¯, ψ(S¯) − S¯) = 1, ψ′(S¯) = 1. This model satisfies assumptions
H1–H7. Hence, one can define
W (k,S) = lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=0
[u (f(kt, ψ(St)− St+1)− kt+1)− u¯]
where u = u
(
f(k, ψ(S)− S)− k). The optimal solution to
max
(k,S)
W (k,S)
under the constraints
∀t, 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt, ψ(St)− St+1),
0 ≤ St+1 ≤ ψ(St), (k0, S0) are given
will converges to (k¯, S¯) if there exists a good programme from (k0, S0).
7 Comments
1. Since our criterion W is a sum of utilities, it is independent in the sense of
Chichilnisky [1996] (p. 246), that is the marginal rate of substitution between
the utilities of two periods t1 and t2 depends only on the numbers t1 and t2. In
particular, a criterion satisfying the independence property is represented by a
linear function of the utility streams. In this perspective, the Rawls criterion,
which can be shown to be non-dictatorial, is not independent. Observe that
our criterion is also Paretian and anonymous.
2. As mentioned by Chichilnisky, in the discounted utilitarian criterion, the
present is dictatorial while the future is not if we impose as in Chichinisky
[1996] that supt at ≤ 1, where at ≥ 0, ∀t.
Indeed, assume
+∞∑
t=0
βtat >
+∞∑
t=0
βta′t
and
δ =
+∞∑
t=0
βtat −
+∞∑
t=0
βta′t,
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where β < 1 is the discount factor. Then there exists N , such that for any
(ct)t : 0 ≤ ct ≤ 1, any (c′t)t : 0 ≤ c′t ≤ 1, we always have
∀n > N,
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtct +
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtc′t <
δ
2
and hence
n∑
t=0
βtat +
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtct >
n∑
t=0
βta′t +
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtc′t.
We have shown that the present is dictatorial.
Now, let
+∞∑
t=0
βtat >
+∞∑
t=0
βta′t.
Then there exists N , such that for any n > N ,
∑+∞
t=n+1 β
tat <
∑+∞
t=0 β
ta′t. Take
bt = 0, for t = 0, ..., n. Then
n∑
t=0
βtbt +
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtat <
+∞∑
t=0
βta′t.
In other words, the future is not dictatorial.
But the condition supt at ≤ 1 is actually crucial to prove that the present is dic-
tatorial in the discounted utilitarian criterion. To see that, drop the assumption
supt at ≤ 1 and use l∞+ . Again, let
+∞∑
t=0
βtat >
+∞∑
t=0
βta′t.
Let N be given. Take ct = 0, ∀t ≥ N + 1, and c′t = γ, t ≥ N + 1, with
γ
∑+∞
t=N+1 >
∑+∞
t=0 β
tat.
The sequences (a0, .., aN , cN+1, ..., ct, ..) and (a′0, ..., a′N , c
′
N+1, ..., c
′
N+τ , ..) be-
long to l∞+ . We have
N∑
t=0
βtat +
+∞∑
t=N+1
βtct <
N∑
t=0
βta′t +
+∞∑
t=N+1
βtc′t.
That shows the present is not dictatorial.
However, when the discounted utilitarian criterion is used in an optimal growth
model such as ours, the present becomes dictatorial. Indeed, given k0 large
enough, the feasible capital stocks will be bounded by ‖k0‖. This implies the
feasible consumptions be bounded by some A(k0) (see Le Van and Dana [2003],
chap. 4). The proof given above applies.
3. We now give two examples of non-dictatorial criteria.
18
3.1. Rawls’ criterion
Let
W (a) = inf
t
at, at ≥ 0, ∀t.
We claim that the present is NOT dictatorial for this criterion.
Let W (a) > W (b). Take ct = 0, ∀t. For any n, define d(n)t = at, for t ≤ n,
and d(n)t = ct, ∀t > n. Then 0 =W (d(n)) ≤W (b).
We now show that the future is NOT dictatorial.
Again, letW (a) > W (b). Take ct = 0, ∀t. For any n, define d(n)t = ct, for t ≤
n, and d(n)t = at, ∀t > n. Then 0 =W (d(n)) ≤W (b).
3.2. Chichilnisky’s Criterion
W (a) =
+∞∑
t=0
βtat + φ(a),
where φ is purely additive, increasing, i.e. φ is an increasing continuous linear
form on l∞, φ(a) = 0 if {t : at 6= 0} is finite, and hence φ(a) = 0 if at → 0 when
t → +∞. If φ is well chosen then this criterion is not dictatorial, neither for
the present nor for the future.
However, we give an example where the Chichilnisky’s criterion is dictatorial
for the present when φ is not well chosen.
Assume φ(1) < 11−β . Let a = 1 and b satisfy
∑+∞
t=0 β
tbt + φ(1) < 11−β . Then
+∞∑
t=0
βtbt + φ(b) ≤
+∞∑
t=0
βtbt + φ(1) <
+∞∑
t=0
βtat + φ(a).
We have, for any (ct)t : ct ≥ 0, ∀t, supt ct ≤ 1, any (dt)t : dt ≥ 0, ∀t, supt dt ≤
1, for any n large enough
n∑
t=0
βtat +
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtct + φ(a0, ...an, cn+1, ...)
≥
n∑
t=0
βtat =
1
1− β −
βn+1
1− β
>
n∑
t=0
βtbt +
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtdt + φ(1)
≥
n∑
t=0
βtbt +
+∞∑
t=n+1
βtdt + φ(b0, ..., bn, dn+1, ...)
4. We consider again the economy set in Section 2. Let us consider the problem
max lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u(x, x)]
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under the constraints
∀t, xt+1 ∈ Γ(xt), x0 is given.
We will show that this problem can be approximated as follows. Assume
G(x0) 6= ∅. Let x∗ be optimal from x0. We know that x∗t → x. since (x, x) ∈
intgraphΓ, there exists T0 such that for any t ≥ T0, x ∈ Γ(x∗t ). Let consider the
problem, for T ≥ T0,
max
T∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u(x, x)]
under the constraints
∀t, xt+1 ∈ Γ(xt), x0 is given and xT+1 = x.
Let (x̂t(T ))Tt=0 be the optimal solution. Let
x̂(T) = (x0, x̂1(T ), ..., x̂T (T ), x, x, ...)
We have
T∑
t=0
[u(x̂t(T ), x̂t+1(T ))− u(x, x)] ≥
T−1∑
t=0
[
u(x∗t , x
∗
t+1)− u(x, x)
]
+[u(x∗T , x)− u(x, x)] .
and
+∞∑
t=0
[u(x̂t(T ), x̂t+1(T ))− u] =
T∑
t=0
[u(x̂t(T ), x̂t+1(T ))− u]
=
T−1∑
t=0
[u(x̂t(T ), x̂t+1(T ))− u] + [u(x̂T (T ), x)− u]
≥
T−1∑
t=0
[
u(x∗t , x
∗
t+1)− u
]
+ [u(x∗T , x)− u]
The sequence x̂(T) converges (for the product topology) to x̂ when T → +∞.
From proposition 3, and since x∗T → x, one gets
+∞∑
t=0
[u(x̂t, x̂t+1)− u] ≥ lim sup
T
+∞∑
t=0
[u(x̂t(T ), x̂t+1(T ))− u]
≥
+∞∑
t=0
[
u(x∗t , x
∗
t+1)− u
]
Since x̂t+1 ∈ Γ(x̂t), ∀t, we have x̂ = x∗ since u is strictly concave. In other
words, the sequences x̂(T) approximate x∗.
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5. We show that our methodology can be used for an economy with exogenous
growth. Consider for instance an economy where for each period t, one has
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt ≤ (1 + g)(1−α)tKαt , 0 < α < 1.
Let ct = Ct(1+g)t , kt =
Kt
(1+g)t . One obtains
ct + kt+1(1 + g) ≤ kαt + (1− δ)kt.
Denote by f the function f(k) = kα + (1 − δ)k. Let v be the instantaneous
utility function and u(k, y) = v(f(k) − (1 + g)y). Let u = u(k, k) where k
maximizes {f(k)− (1+ g)k : 0 ≤ k(1+ g) ≤ f(k)}. Observe that F ′(k) = g+ δ,
where F (k) = kα. Our model will be
max
+∞∑
t=0
[u(kt, kt+1)− u]
under the constraints
∀t, 0 ≤ (1 + g)kt+1 ≤ f(kt), k0 is given.
6. Our criterion does not require the state space X to be compact, while the
Chichilnisky and the Basu-Mitra criteria require a model with a compact state
space. One can criticize that our criterion excludes the consumption paths
(ct) which converge to zero. But observe, for such a situation, the value of
the stream of utilities generated by the discounted utilitarian criterion is the
same as the one generated by Chichilnisky’s criterion since φ(u) = 0, where
ut = u(ct), ∀t. For a sustainable growth, it is reasonable to have optimal paths
which converge to a steady state which can be interpreted as the Golden Rule.
7. Let x∗ be an optimal path from x0 in our model. Assume G(x0) 6= ∅.
Let ζ∗t = u(x∗t , x∗t+1),∀t. For two feasible sequences x,x′, we write ζt =
u(xt, xt+1), ζ ′t = u(x′t, x′t+1). Following Basu and Mitra [2007], we write ζ U ζ′
if there exists N such that
(
N∑
t=0
(ζt−u), ζN+1−u, ..., ζN+τ −u, ...) ≥ (
N∑
t=0
(ζ ′t−u), ζ ′N+1−u, ..., ζ ′N+τ −u, ...)
In particular, if there exists N such that
(
N∑
t=0
(ζt−u), ζN+1−u, ..., ζN+τ −u, ...) > (
N∑
t=0
(ζ ′t−u), ζ ′N+1−u, ..., ζ ′N+τ −u, ...)
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then ζ U ζ′. The Social Welfare Relation U is called utilitarian Social
Welfare Function. Using the version given by Atsumi [1965], von Weizsacker
[1965], and Brock [1970b], they define an overtaking Social Welfare Relation as
follows:
ζ O ζ′ iff
- either ∃N¯ , such that ∑Nt=0(ζt − u) >∑Nt=0(ζ ′t − u) for all N ≥ N¯ ,
- or ∃N¯ such that ∑Nt=0(ζt − u) =∑Nt=0(ζ ′t − u) for all N ≥ N¯ .
Hence, ζ O ζ′ iff there exists N¯ such that
∑N
t=0(ζt − u) >
∑N
t=0(ζ
′
t − u) for
all N ≥ N¯ .
We say that a feasible path x is maximal if there exists no feasible x′ with
x′ U x. For the one-dimension Ramsey model, Basu and Mitra [2007] show
that if x∗ is maximal then for any feasible path x′, we have ζ∗ O ζ′. In our
paper, actually we extend their result to a multi-dimensional Ramsey model.
Indeed, from theorem 4, there exists an optimal path x∗. We claim that it is
maximal. If not, there will be x and N such that
(
N∑
t=0
(ζt−u), ζN+1−u, ..., ζN+τ−u, ...) > (
N∑
t=0
(ζ∗t −u), ζ∗N+1−u, ..., ζ∗N+τ−u, ...)
But in this case,
+∞∑
t=0
(ζt − u) >
+∞∑
t=0
(ζ∗t − u)
contradicting the optimality of x∗.
Now assume that graphΓ is convex. In this case, for any feasible x different
from x∗
+∞∑
t=0
[u(x∗t , x
∗
t+1)− u] >
+∞∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
We claim that ζ∗ O ζ. Indeed, if there exists no N¯ such that
N∑
t=0
[u(x∗t , x
∗
t+1)− u] >
N∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
for any N ≥ N¯ , there will be an increasing sequence (Nk)k such that
Nk∑
t=0
[u(x∗t , x
∗
t+1)− u] ≤
Nk∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
for every k. This implies
+∞∑
t=0
[u(x∗t , x
∗
t+1)− u] ≤
+∞∑
t=0
[u(xt, xt+1)− u]
22
and x is another optimal path contradicting theorem 4.
8. Fleurbaey and Michel [2003] prove that there exists no social welfare relation
which is together weak Pareto, indifferent to finite permutations and strongly
continuous (i.e. continuous for the sup-norm topology). In our paper, the social
welfare function is Pareto, indifferent to finite permutations but only upper
semi-continuous for the product topology. Observe there is a parallel between
their extended Ramsey criterion which is limT→+∞
∑T
t=0[u(ct) − û] where ct
denotes the consumption at date t and û is the “bliss point”, û = limx→+∞ u(x),
and our criterion limT→+∞
∑T
t=0[u(xt, xt+1)−u], since u = limt→+∞ u(xt, xt+1)
(any good programme converges).
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